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ABSTRACT 
The potential negative consequences of high financial volatility 
have been an important concern recently. Although its empirical relevance 
has not been proved conclusively, clear theoretic and intuitive arguments 
justify this concern. Many efforts have been conducted, therefore, to 
determine which is the relevant concept of volatility and how to measure 
it, which factors explain the course it follows, and which steps should be 
taken in order to curb volatility. In this paper we present evidence on 
these issues focusing on the Spanish experience. 
Spanish financial markets are an interesting case study because 
of al least two reasons. First, although they have developed but relatively 
recently, they have quickly and effectively become part of the general 
processes of innovation, globalisation and internationalisation. And 
second, there have been major economic policy changes affecting the 
Spanish financial arena, such as the entry, in 1989, of the peseta into 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) or the opening of derivatives markets in 1990 . 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous revolution in 
flnanciel markets. The as yet unfinished processes of deregulation of 
domestic flnanciel markets, liberalisation of international capital flows and 
financiel innovation, together with the development of rapid and 
sophisticated computer and telecommunications networks have made 
flnanciel markets more global and international than ever before. The 
economic benefits of this revolution are unquestionable: flnanciel markets 
are now more able to ensure an efficient allocation of resources by 
offering investors broader opportunities, lower costs and more effective 
flnanciel risk management. 
However, there is a general perception, mostly among investors 
and politicians, that the volatility of flnanciel prices is higher now than 
in previous periods and some have linked this increase to the above­
mentioned processes of internationalisation , globalisation and innovation. 
This perception has been heightened by the observation, at an 
international level, of episodes of high volatility such as the 1987 stock 
market crash, the 1992-93 ERM crises, the 1994 international bond prices 
rally and the 1994-95 Mexican peso crises. 
Economists have offered several -not always well proven­
explanations of the undesirable economic consequences of higher flnanciel 
volatility. Volatility matters because investors are concerned about the 
uncertainty of their future wealth. In this context, higher volatility may 
increase the prospects of incurring unforeseen future losses. If an 
episode of high volatility is observed, investors may lose confidence in 
flnanciel markets, seeing flnanciel asset prices buffeted by excessive 
swings unwarranted by changes in economic fundamentals or expectations 
about them. This lack of confidence may lead to an increase in risk premis 
and (or) to a shift in investors' funds to less risky assets with a 
concomitant reduction in the liquidity of risky assets markets, which 
would imply higher transaction costs. The solvency of the flnanciel 
system may also be threatened, since an increase in interest rate volatility 
can lead to liquidity problems for flnanciel intermediaries with maturity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities. Furthermore, the increase in 
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risk premia and in transaction costs may tend to raise the cost of funding 
investment projects, thus discouraging both domestic and foreign direct 
investment. International capital flows.may be reduced and, moreover, 
the growth of world trade may slow since the greater uncertainty would 
tend to raise the price volatility of internationally traded goods. 
The concern about an increase in financial volatility and the 
perception that volatility is undesirable have led to several policy 
proposals to deal with it. These proposals can be classified in two broad 
groups: those implying tougher market regulation and those implying 
greater policy coordination. The first group of proposals are generally 
based on the notion that speculation, which has been enhanced by 
financial innovation and by the internations1isation and globaUsation of 
securities markets, can exacerbate price movements. The second group 
of proposals are hased on the notion that changes in expectations play an 
important role in how financial prices move, so that uncertainty about 
macroeconomic policies, non-credible targets and policy inconsistencies 
across countries is rather destabiUsing. In any case, to have confidence 
in any of these proposals it is crucial to analyse, first, whether financial 
price volatility has change remarkably over time; and second, whether 
the factors that the proposals seek to modify have, in effect, conditioned 
such changes in volatility. 
In this paper we present evidence on these issues ·focusing on 
the Spanish experience. Spanish financial markets are an interesting case 
study. Although they have developed but relatively recently, they have 
quickly and effectively become part of the general processes of 
innovation, globaUsation and internationalisation. Also, there have been 
major economic policy changes affecting the Spanish financial arena, such 
as the entry, in 1989, of the peseta into the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Moneta.ry System (EMS) or the opening of 
derivatives markets in 1990. At present, Spanish ffnl!,ncial markets are 
substantially integrated at the international level, and the important role 
played by foreign investors testifies to this. Consequently, Spanish 
financial markets have suffered, on occasions quite severely, the 
international episodes of financial price swings mentioned above, with the 
concomitant concern about volatility and how to deal with it. 
-6-
Our fIrst goal in the paper is to identify the main features of 
recent volatility in the four major Spanish finenciel markets (the stock, 
public debt, interbank deposit and foreign exchange markets) during the 
period for which data are available, namely January 19BB-July 1995. In 
this conn.ection, we test whether price volatility is charscterised by a 
specific trend as would be the esse if higher volatility were the cost of the 
aforementioned processes. Also J we examine the degree of volatility 
persistence and potential common patterns in the various markets. This 
analysis of the general chsrscteristics of volatility, interesting by itself, 
will help us in our second goal of studying the impact on finenciel 
volatility of some of the most significant events that have occurred in 
recent years; in particulsr, the modifications in the peseta exchange rate 
regime and the opening of futures and options markets in 1990. The 
findings of these analyses will act as a basis for evaluating policy 
proposals to curb the volatility affecting exchange rates and derivatives 
markets. 
The paper is orgsnised as follows. Section 2 discusses how 
volatility should be measured, distinguishing between prices not 
controlled by policy actions and prices that are, such as the peseta 
exchange rate since ERM entry. Section 3 studies the general 
charscteristics observed in price volatility in the above-mentioned 
markets. Section 4 discusses the effect on exchange rate risk of the major 
recent modifications in the peseta exchange rate regime; and the effect of 
derivatives trading on price volatility in the underlying spot market. 
Finally, section 5 summarises the main findings . 
2. HOW TO MEASURE VOLATILITY 
The common practice in recent finenciel literature is to measure 
the volatility associated with the movement of a variable x, between t 
and t+1: , i . e .  risk, by its conditional variance: 
(1) 
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where E. Is the conditional (on information available at time t) 
expectation operator. 
Note that It Is the risk perceived by agents which determines 
their decisions and which, therefore, could have the negetive implications 
mentioned in terms of deterring financial and real flows. In this sense, 
any measure of volatility must satisfy two requirements. Firat, it must not 
reflect all the fluctuations of the series, since those which are foreseeable 
can not be a source of risk. And second, it should take into account 
agents' perception about this future uncertainty, i.e. the expected· 
varlsbllity of the unanticipated component of the series. Thus, the 
advantage of using the proposed measure instead of others such as the 
unconditional varlsnce Is clear. 
Consequently, in order to measure the relevant concept of 
volatility, a model for the conditional mean of the varlsble Is needed. In 
this paper, we follow the standard approach for financial series, I.e. 
univarlste models. This Is because they enable as to draw on the 
availability of daily data; and because, in general, structure! models 
which incorporate varlsbles observed with lower frequencies have not 
improved the predictions of univarlste models. 
Nevertheless, it Is important at this point to differentiate 
variables which can fluctuate freely from others that are controlled by the 
authorities who defend a certain regime to which they have committed 
themselves. For the latter kind of varlsbles, we should take into account 
not only the observed evolution of the series, but alao agents-perception 
about a possible change in the process followed by the varlsble due to a 
change in the regime established by the authorities. If agents consider 
that the process Is likely to change, even though this might not be later 
confirmed and therefore not reflected in the data, the past of the series 
can not give an accurate measurement of expectations. As Ayuso, Pllrez­
Jurado and Restoy (1994) demonstrate, the traditional measure of 
volatility should be corrected when there Is not perfect credibility of the 
-8-
fluctuation regime to take into account this "peso problem"'. Thus, 
assume that tbe controlled series y... follows a process witb conditional 
mean, at t, �, and conditional variance � .  However, agents 
assigned, at t, a probability Pt to tbe fact that tbe reiPme will change 
so that y to< will follow another process witb a different conditional mean 
IJ! . The corrected measure of risk, derived in the appendix, takes the 
form: 
(2) 
where 
(3) 
is the expected jump in tbe conditional mean when tbe process changes2. 
Therefore, if a change of regime is expected with a positive 
prob£.bility, tbe conditional variance of the exchange rate has two 
components. The first one is tbe witbin-tbe-regime conditional variance 
� (tbe conditional variance when regimes changes are not taken into 
account). The second component measures the effect on the risk arising 
from tbe possibility of a change in the conditional mean of tbe process. 
Several features of the second component are wortb commenting. On one 
hand, if credibility is imperfect (P.>O) ,the second component is always 
positive. In such a case, the conditional volatility based only on tbe 
observed evolution of the series, i.e. the witbin-tbe-regime conditional 
variance, underestimates unambiguously the risk which agents associate 
witb its future evolution. On tbe otber l)and, the higher tbe absolute 
expected variation of tbe conditional mean, tbe higher tbe correction term 
that should be added to tbe witbin-tbe-regime volatility. Finally, tbe 
correction term is not monotonic in Pt ' reaching a maximum for 
, The name is due to tbe fact that tbis problem was first analysed for 
the Mexican peso exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar (see Krasker, 1980). 
2 Notice that in this case the change is chsracterised only by a jump 
in tbe mean. For a more general case see Ayuso et al. (1994). 
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p. = 0.5 ,given It! and Il! . The Intuition of this result is clear: the 
situation of highest uncertainty about the future is that In which the 
agents assign the same probability to the maintenance of the current 
regime and to the jump to the alternative. 
To obtain h. ,  for free floating varisbles, and � , for 
controlled varisbles, we follow the standard ARCH methodology , 
originally proposed by Engle (1982) and generalised by several authors'. 
This methodology has proved to be appropriste to measure conditional 
variances of financial series. Specifically, we will use the model proposed 
by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle, 1993 (GJR In what follows): 
• q 
� = ao + E (at e!-1+1 +Y 1 S�-i+l �-1+1) + E �1 �-1 (4) 1� 1� 
1, if ". < 0 
0, if ". �O 
Under the different alternatives Included In the ARCH family of 
models the one chosen has two principal advantages. First, being 
sufficiently general (the GARCH models are a particular case In point), 
it impcses linearity. Linearity allows us to compute volatility at horizons 
longer tllan one day from the estimates obtained with daily data. This 
notably increases our sample size. Second, the inclusion of S;_lE!-i 
. allows for different responses of volatility to positive and negative 
innovations. Therefore, it is possible to test whether volatility is more 
sensitive to financial price falls than to financial price rises. This 
asymmetry, common In other financial markets, should be reflected In a 
positive value of the coefficients Y 1 • 
With regard to the correction term that shouid be added to � 
'Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) and Engle and Ng (1993) review 
the different models that have been developed within this methodology. 
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in the case of controlled variables, the methodology should naturally be 
specific to eech case. In principle, the exchsnge rate and the interbank 
rate are examples of variables that are controlled -at least part!ally- by 
policy actions. Nevertheless, the empirical relevance of the peso problem 
for meesuring interest rate risk depends on the distance between the 
maturity analysed and that corresponding to the interest rate for which 
the monetary authority sets its instrumental targets. Thus, the analysis 
of the official interest rate is clearly subject to a peso problem in that it 
moves infrequently -only when monetary policy actions are taken- but 
agents expect more frequent movements that, in fact, do not occur. 
Nevertheless, as we move along the yield curve, the interest rates, 
although influenced by the official interest rate, react increasingly to 
'market forces', including the own expectations about future interest rate 
jumps. Therefore, for maturities far enough from that corresponding to 
the official interest rate, clear-cut jumps are rarely observed and, 
consequently, the empirical relevance of the peso problem tends to 
disappeer. In our case, that empirical relevance is negligible. 
In the case of the exchange rate, we use the information 
contained in the interest rate different!a1 to obtain p, d. . This 
information, combined with that of the exchsnge rate jumps observed 
around devaluations, provides a separate estimation of d. . Specifically, 
if uncovered interest rate parity holds and, in the absence of 
rea1ignments, the exchange rate follows a random walk, it is obvious that 
(5) 
where � and �. are the domestic and foreign interest rates 
of 1: -<lay deposits in the euromarket. Expected jump sizes d, are taken 
from Ayuso and Perez-Jurado (1995) who estimated a panel Tobit model 
for all the rea1ignments in the ERM since its creation in 1979. In this 
model, the expected jump sizes depend on a country dummy (with a 
coefficient of -16.22 in the Spanish case) and the real exchsnge rate 
against the Deutschemark (with a coefficient of 0.24, cOnstant across 
countries) . 
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3. VOLATILITY IN SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS 
In this section we apply the methodology described in the 
previous section to analyse price volstility in the four major Spanish 
financlal markets: the government debt, stock, money and foreign 
exchange markets . For the first two, we focus on two price indices that 
include the most actively traded assets in the respectivt;> market: the 
government debt index prepered and released by the Banco de Espaf!a', 
and the IBEX 35'. For the money market, we look at movements in the 3-
month interbank rate and, finally, the Peseta-Deutschemark exchange 
rate is the representative price chosen for the foreign exchange market. 
tittle additional comment is needed for these last two choices. 
As commented in section 2, we distinguish between prices that 
can be controlled -at least pertially- by economic pollcy actions and prices 
that can not . In principle, both tha exchange rate and the interbank 
interest rate belong to the first group. Nevertheless, the empirical 
relevance of the peso problem when measuring interest rate risk may be 
considered negligible since the maturity chosen is 3 montha and the Banco 
de Espaf!a has instrumental targets in terms of the overnight interest 
rate . Thus, in what follows, we distinguish between financlal prices for 
which the so cslled peso problem is not relevant (the government debt 
index prepared by the Banco de Espaf!a -IDt - , the IBEX 35 stock 
exchange index -IBt - and the 3-month interbank rate -;. - ) -and the 
peseta-deutschemark exchange rate -ESP/DEM.- • 
3.1 VolstiHty in the debt ...... ket, the atock exchange and the money 
...... kets. 
Although we focus on the risk assoclated with the course of 
prices in the following month, the relstively short life of the financlal 
markets considered requires the use of a higher, daily, frequency to have 
an appropriste number of observations to estimate the relevant 
, See Banco de Espaf!a (1991) for details. 
, See Sociedades de Bolss (1991). 
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parameters . In order to keep homogeneity, our available daily sample 
spans the period from 1 January 1988 to 31 July 19956• 
Following section 2, we start by consistently estimating the 
innovation series "" in each market. Then, we estimate the different GJR 
processes for each of the three daily residual series. Table 1 shows that 
autoregressive processes with five lags suffice to eliminate any residual 
autocorrelation from the financisl price series considered . Table 2 shows 
that the estimated GJR processes fit quite well. Thus, parameter 
estimates are clearly significant and there is no evidence of residual 
conditional heteroscedasticity (HI, H5 and H15 tests) or residual 
asymmetries (AS test) . Moreover, the NN and NP tests show that linearity 
seems a reasonable approach . Finally, Charts 1 to 3 show the (monthly 
averages of the daily) conditional variances at a I-month term' . Some 
results are worth commenting: 
- Charts 1 to 3 show that volatility in the stock exchange is 
markedly higher than in both the money and debt markets . Moreover, 
prices in the government debt market are aiso more volatile than those 
in the money market. This result is quite usual' • 
- According to estimates of y 1 in Table 2, only the debt index 
volatility shows asymmetric responses to shocks . This asymmetry in the 
Spanish government debt market was previously found by Ayuso and 
Nunez (1995) . Thus, unanticipated price fells (negative news) lead to 
higher increases in volatility than unanticipated price rises (positive 
news) . The absence of asymmetry in the stock exchange Is especielly 
• There are no data at ell for the ID series prior to 1988. For the other 
two series, we could have gone back only until 1984 . In any case, results 
do not change If we consider that enlarged sample. 
, V t (xt+1_th) is easily obtained from the autoregressive process for 
the daily conditional mean and the GJR process for the daily conditional 
variance .  See Ayuso et aI. (1994). 
• See, for example, Shiller (1�88). 
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striking. Such asymmetry, based on the so-called leverage effect", 
has been frequently found for several international stock exchange 
indices'·. Nevertheless, Alonso (1995) also found symmetric 
responses in the Spanish stock exchange using a different conditional 
variance model. 
- The parameter estimates in Table 2 imply that, at daily 
frequencies, conditional variance is highly persistentll• However, 
Charts 1 to 3 show that persistence is not so high when we consider the 
volatility associated with financial prices in the following month. 
- Charts 1 to 3 also reveal other interesting features. First, 
there are no trends in any of these market volatilities. While we can 
identify, for each market, periods in which volatility markedly 
increases. In general, such increases do not tend to last and are 
followed by later reductions; e. g. the only lasting increase seems to be 
that in the debt market around the summer of 1992. Second, volatilities 
in these three markets do not seem to follow, in general, a common 
pattern, although there are important simllarities in some of their 
responses to certain events. Thus, the peseta's entry into the ERM 
coincided with the beginning of a relative stable period in both the 
money market and the debt market (but not in the stock exchange). 
This period ended around the summer of 1992, when a simultaneous 
increase in the volatility in the three markets was recorded. As 
commented, this increase seems to be more lasting in the debt market, 
where volatility has not returned to its previous level since. 
In the same vein, the well-known bond crisis in 1994 had a clear 
effect on debt volatility and a less clear-Clit one on the stock market. 
" See Black (1976 ) .  
,. See, for example, French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) or Nelson 
(1990) . 
11 That is, a, +�y, +�, +�2 is closer to 1 .  Following the results in Cai 
(1994) we allow fo� some changes in the constant of the GJR model in 
order to test if this persistence is due to (non considered) structural 
changes. Results are contrary to that possibility. 
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The money market, however, did not register a similar volatility 
increase. The period around the peseta's devaluation in March 1995 also 
shows an important volatility increase in the money and debt markets 
without any remarkable effect on stock exchange volatility. 
These partial similarities in the responses to certain events 
justify a more rigorous analysis of possible connections among the 
different market volatilities. We undertake this analysis as follows. 
We start by obtaining consistent estimates of the innovations in 
each market not in an univariate framework but in a multivariate one. 
Thus, for each price, five lags of the two remaining financial prices are 
also included as additional regressors in their respective univariate 
model. We then estimate a new GJR model that also includes lagged 
squared residuals corresponding to the other two financial markets. If 
squared innovations in market A do not help to explain volatility in market 
B, but innovations in market B are significant in the market A volatility 
model, we directly include in this last model the conditional volatility in 
market B. Observe that including the conditional variance Instead of 
(past squared) innovations is a way of summarising in a single variable 
the effects of all the past squared innovations in one market. Table 3 
shows the main results of this analysis. 
As can be seen, the inclusion of other market squared 
innovations does not substantially modify the effect of the own 
innovations. Table 3 shows that the stock exchange volatility seems to be 
isolated from the innovations in the remaining markets. Nevertheless, 
both the money market volatility and the government debt market 
volatility increase when stock exchange market volatility increases. 
Moreover, the debt market volatility reacts (positively) to innovations in 
the money market. In any case, although statistically significant, these 
effects are quantitatively small. Evaluated at the volatility average 
values, the short-term elasticities of the money market and the debt 
market volatilities to changes in the stock exchange volatility12 are 
12 That is x:I,ID. 
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around 0 . 5% .  The short-term elasticlty of the debt merket volatility to the 
money merket volatility is. higher but still small: 2%. Long-term 
elasticities" are e1ao low: 3%, 4% and 12%, respectively. Thus, we can 
conclude from this evidence that there is some contegion in the different 
merkets, but most of each volatility is explained by Innovations in the own 
merket. 
3.2 Volatility in the fol'llign exchange .... ket. 
In this subsection, we focus on the period of pesete membership 
of the ERM (19 June 1989 - 31 July 1995), leaving for section 4 the 
analysis of the effects of Its entry into the mechanism. The existence of 
a peso problem in the estimate of the univariate process followed by the 
exchange rate requires a method of analysis other than that followed in 
the previous subsection. On the one hand, we cannot estimate the 
exchange rate conditional mean using exclusively past observed exchange 
rates". On the other hand, as commented in Section 2, we have to add 
to the within-the-regime conditional variance a correction term. That term 
takes into account the fact that agents usually assign a positive 
probability to a devaluation happening in the near future. 
As in Ayuso, Perez-Jurado and Restoy (1994), we deal with the 
first problem assuming that the (log) exchange rates follow a random walk 
and then testing If results significantly change when (some) mean 
reversion is allowed for". In particular, we allow for the maximum mean 
reversion whicli, given the interest rate differential between Spain and 
Germany, does not imply revaluation expectetions'·. Table 4 shows the 
"That is, 
"'x 
� bIB 1 
----
, 
� ? ,:1;-11; 
x =i, ID. 
" See Chen and GiovRnninni (1992) .  
" We can justify this procedure on the basis of the difficulties in 
stetistically discriminating between the random walk and the foreseeable 
slow mean reversion that characterises these high frequency date. 
,. This maximum mean reversion is computed as follows. If the process 
followed by the (log) exchange rate when there is no devaluations is 
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estimates for the within-the-regime conditional variance � • Chart 4 
depicts the correction term and Chart 5 shows the evolution of both the 
within-the-regime volatility � and the conditional variance '" . 
The correction term follows a decreasing path as from June 1989, 
thus reflecting a progressive increase in the peseta's credibility. Thla 
path breaks around June 1992 and the correction term increases until the 
ERM reform in August 1993. As can be seen, this reform is associated with 
an important increase in credibility. Since then, it has held stable until 
the peseta's latest devaluation in March 1995. 
Comparing Chart 5 with Charts 1 to 3, we observe that the 
exchange rate risk is lower than that corresponding to the stock exchange 
but still higher than the level that characterises the debt market. As in 
the other three markets, parameter estimates imply an important degree 
of (daily) conditional variance persistence, even though we have allowed 
for two structural changes in June 1992 and August 1993. Again, thla 
persistence decreases when we consider risks at a term longer than just 
one day. 
Chart 5 also reveals that there are no trends discernible in the 
course of exchange rate risk. We observe, instead, significant increases 
in periods usually characterised as of exchange rate crisis (the autumn 
of 1992 or March 1995) . But such increases disappear later on. Events in 
other financial markets such as the bond crisis in 1994, however, do not 
seem to have any effect on exchange rate risk. Unfortunately, the special 
nature of the exchange rate risk measure prevents us from repeating an 
and uncovered interest parity roughly holds, then a tittle algebra shows 
that .r t;r 
E,,(d .. ,) > 0 .. <p' > 1 + It- _, Vst<S 
St-S 
For each period between the different peseta central parity 
devaluations, we estimate s as the corresponding sample mean value 
and <p as the minimum value that satisfies the inequallty. 
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analysis similar to that in Table 317• 
Finally, both the second column in Table 4 and Chart 6 provide 
evidence favouring the hypothesis that mean reversion in the exchange 
rate process does not alter the qualitetive results concerning exchange 
rate risk. 
Summarising, results in this section show that the processes of 
liberalisation, internationa1isation and globalisation marking present 
developments in the major Spanish financial markets have not been 
accompanied by a parallel increase in financial price volatility. We do not 
observe volatility trends in any of the markets considered. We observe J 
however, periodical episodes of high volatility. In this sense J our results 
are in line with the views of several authors who have recently argued 
that financial markets are not more volatile now than before". 
Unfortunately, the available date do not allow to investigate whether, as 
has also been suggested, these transitory increases in volatility are now 
higher and more frequent than before. 
Moreover, a simple analysis of the interconnections among the 
different Spanish financial markets shows that day-to-day volatilities 
seem to react, basically, to news concerning the own market, although 
when relevant events such as exchange rate crises occur, we observe 
contagion effects. In that sense, the foreign exchange market seems to be 
a primary source of financial volatility. 
4. FACTORS EXPLAINING PRICE VOLATILITY EVOLUTION 
One of the main conclusions of the analysis in the previous 
17 Observe that news in the exchange rate markets include two 
components. They include, first, the unexpected movement in the 
exchange rate. But they also incorporate a term, difficult to estimate, 
capturing the fact that a devaluation has (or has not) occurred, given 
that some probability was assigned, ex-ante, to this devaluation. 
18 See, for example Crockett (1995) ,  Goodhart (1995) and Shiller 
(1988) • 
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section is that no upward trend in financlal price volatility is found, 
although there are episodes of considerably high volatility. The 
observation of these episodes has prompted some concern about the 
possibility that these peaks could be a potential cause of systemic crisis. 
In the same vein, it has also been argued that the current levels of 
volatility, even if they were not higher than before, could be more 
worrying because economic agents now participate more in the financial 
markets and, ;hence J they are more exposed to risk. In any case, these 
and other arguments have led to numerous proposals aimed at curbing 
volatility. But for policymakers to be able to set effective policies in 
place, the sources of such volatility need to be identified. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about what factors determine 
volatility. The efficient market model does not offer an explanation when 
prices change due to factors other than a change in the fundamentals or 
in the expectations about them. While there are theoretical models 
(informationally efficient and with expectations formed rationally) with 
equilibrium prices deviating from their fundamental value (speculative 
bubbles models) there is not yet a well accepted general structural model 
of volatility. 
However, the economic literature points out several potential 
factors that could partly explain financial price volatility. Some 
economists argue that speculation, enhanced mostly by financlal 
innovations (like futures and options) but also by the internationallsation 
and globalisation of securities markets, can be destabilising. The policy 
proposals to curb volatility derived from this line of thought imply, 
therefore, tougher market regulation and include proposals such as 
higher derivatives margin requirements; price limits; restrictions on 
certain market strategies, such as portfolio insurance; controls on 
international capital movements; and some even more radical solutions 
such as stopping derivatives trading. 
Other economists emphasise the role played by changes in 
expectations about price volatility. Foliowing this line of thought, 
changes in monetary and/or exchange rate regimes affect financlal price 
volatility, and uncertainty about macroeconomic policies, non-credible 
- 1 9 -
targets, inconsistency of policies across countries and internationally 
different markets regulation are destabilising for financial markets. 
Thus, the proposals by those economists advocate for greater policy 
coordination, both inter and intra nationally, and include exchange rate 
target zones; globaJised financial market supervision and regulation, at 
both the inter-country and inter-industry level; central banks standing 
ready to perform. their role as lenders of last resort, etc. 
In this section we focus on two of these factors which are 
especia1Jy relevant for the recent Spanish experience. In section 4.1, we 
examine the effect on exchange rate risk of the major changes in the 
peseta exchange rate regime in the period 1988-1995. In section 4.2, we 
analyse the effect on spot market price volatility of the introduction into 
the Spanish financial arena of successful futures and options markets. 
4.1. Exchange rate regimes and volatility. 
The setting up of target zones is one of the proposals most 
frequently forwarded to reduce instability in foreign exchange markets. 
This reduction was one of the main objectives pursued by the founders of 
the EMS and by the countries which, like Spain, later became members. 
These countries form a highly and increasingly integrated area and, in 
this context, a high exchange risk perceived by agents could restrict 
international flows and lead to an inneficient allocation of resources in 
both geographical and sectorial terms. On the contrary, the reform of the 
System in August 1993 prompted a concern regarding the possibility that 
the wider margin of fluctuation available could heighten the exchange risk 
perceived by agents, thus undermining the benefits of economic 
integration in Europe. An important question also remains open about the 
appropriate exchange rate regime to be established for the countries 
subject to derogation at the beginning of the Monetary Union. 
Thus, there is a traditional view which associates stringent 
exchange rate regimes with low exchange risk and more flexible ones with 
higher risk. However, as the formulation of the relevant measure of risk 
for a controlled variable (see section 2) clearly shows, whereas the 
degree of rigidity of the exchange rate regime should clearly be a 
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conditioning factor of exchange risk, by limiting observed volatility, the 
credibility of this commitment can also be determinative in explaining such 
risk. Furthermore, exchange rate regimes that severely limit the 
fluctuation of exchange rates could have negetive effects on the perceived 
exchange risk if those regimes are considered to be unsustainable by the 
market. 
In this section we analyse empirically the relationship between 
the degree of rigidity of the exchange rate regime and exchange risk, 
paying particular attention to the role of credibility. We discuss also 
which variables affecting credibility can, in turn, help to explain how 
exchange risk develops 10 • 
The case of the peseta is particularly useful since there have 
been two major changes in recent years in its exchange rate regime. 
Thus, the entry of our currency into the ERM with ±6% bands in June 1989 
and the reform to ±15% bands in August 1993 are appropriate examples for 
comparing free floats with target zones and different degrees of flexibility 
within the same target zone, respectively. However, there have been also 
major changes recently in the fluctuation regimes of other European 
currencies. We will incorporate them into the analysis to see whether the 
conclusions for the peseta can be extended. 
We start by looking at the exchange risk of the peseta around its 
entry into the EMS. As can be seen in chart 7, this entrance did not have 
a clear reduction effect on the exchange risk. On the one hand, the fact 
that the stability of the ESP/DEM exchange rate was already pursued by 
Spanish policy could explain the small reduction effect on the observed 
volatility. On the other hand, the initial lack of confidence in the new 
commitment more than offset this reduction in volatility, leading to an 
increase in exchange risk. Only in the period of maximum stability of the 
ERM (January to May 1992) was this risk lower than before entry. The 
,. In addressing this task we will make use of the empirical findings 
from various research recently conducted at the Banco de Espaila: Ayuso, 
Perez-Jurado and Restoy (1994), Ayuso and Perez-Jurado (1995) and 
Ayuso (1995) . 
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experience of sterling, which joined the ERM in October 1990, is also an 
example of a step towards a stricter regime, but in this case leading to a 
pronounced reduction in exchange risk. On the contrary, the switch to 
a free float made by sterling and the Italian lira in September 1992 was 
accompanied by a clear increase in their respective risks (see table 5). 
Thus J this empirical evidence supports the conventional wisdom that when 
comparing target zones with free floats, exchange rate risk is, in 
general, lower in the former4!o. However, if the target zone suffers from 
a lack of credibility, this can prevent such beneficial effects from arising. 
The reform of the ERM in August 1993 allows for comparison of 
different degrees of rigidity within the same target zone. If we compare 
the period of peseta exchange rate stability with wider bands, in late 1993 
and all of 1994, with the period of ±6% bands, the risk characterising the 
former is 67% lower than during the crisis period, comparable to that of 
the maximum stability period with narrow hands and 20% lower than during 
the two-year period at the beginning of ERM membership. Again, 
comparing this with observed volatility highiights the important role of 
credibility. The observed volatility of the peseta is clearly higher with a 
hand of ±15% than with hands of ±6%. Thus the gain in credibility of the 
fluctuation regime after the August 1993 reform had a greater impact on 
the conditional variance of the exchange rate than the rise in observed 
volatility. The experience of other currencies provides similar conclusions 
(see table 6) •. Thus, for the French and Belgian francs and the Danish 
krone the exchange risk was lower with narrow bands than with wide 
bands only in the period of maximum stability, when their regimes had 
almost perfect credibility. However, in 1990-1991, when the bands were 
not so credible although no speculative attacks were occurring, the 
exchange risk was higher. 
This evidence suggests that; even in the absence of speculative 
attacks, too rigid commitments governing the fluctuation of exchange 
2. This view is also supported by results in European Commission 
(1982) , Padoa-Schioppa (1983), Ungerer et al. (1983, 1986, 1990), Rogoff 
(1985) , Artis and Taylor (1988, 1993) , Pesaran and Robinson (1993) or 
Ayuso (1995), among others. 
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rates can lead to negative effects on the perceived exchange risk. 
Therefore, attempts to reduce exchange rate risk by increasing the 
rigidity of fluctuation regimes may be unsuccessful if the conditions for 
this regime to be credible do not hold . Under these circumstances, to 
reduce the exchange rate risk it may be preferable to adopt less ambitious 
exchange rate commitments that are flexible enough to warrant an 
acceptable degree of credibility, even though they might imply greater 
observed exchange rate volatility . 
It follows from the above that to evaluate the possibility of 
reducing exchange rate risk by means of establishing -or narrowing the 
prevailing- fluctuation bands , it is very important to know which are the 
. variables that agents take into account to assess the sustainability of this 
regime. Several papers in the literature of target zones have addressed 
this question both theoretically and emplrically21. The variables pointed 
out by this literature can be seen as representative of one of the following 
effects: the increase in the reputation of the authorities when official 
parities are sustsined over time; the general conditions in the system (in 
the case of the ERM) ; those macroeconomic imbalances which impose a 
significant cost on maintaining the parity commitment and which could be 
eased with a devaluation (the specific imbalances obviously differ between 
countries) ; and finally, there is some empirical evidence in favour of a 
destabilising effect of the limit of maximum depreciation, I . e .  of an 
adverse effect on credibility of the exchange rate proximity to that limit . 
For the Spanish case, Ayuso and Perez-Jurado (1995) a:nalysed 
the determinants of the expected rate of depreciation (at a one-month 
horizon) associated with devaluations . They explsin separately the 
expected size of depreciation and that of the probability of devaluation. 
According to their results, agents take into account the cumulative losses 
of competitiveness to form their expectations about the size of 
depreciation associated with a potential future devaluation. With respect 
to probability, they conclude that several factors are at play . First , there 
is a reputation effect since the time elapsed without devaluing reduces the 
21 See, for example , Chen and Giovannini (1991) or Lindberg, 
Svensson and SOderlind (1991 ). 
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probability of devaluation and the reputation built up in this way is lost 
if a devaluation occurs . Second, there is an effect of the general pace of 
the system since the probability of devaluation of other ERM currencies 
hes an effect on thet of the peseta. Third, the exchange rate drawing 
closer to the limit of deprecietion increeses the probability of devaluation. 
Lastly, the impact of the cost of parity meintenance implied by 
macroeconomic imbalances is represented by a significant influence of the 
policy dilemma entailing the need for a level of interest rates consistent 
with the defence of the commitment but not with the position in the 
economic cycle. 
Thus, although it is not realistic to try to explain credibility 
fully by movements in these variables, it seems cleer thet they can 
condition the success of attempts to reduce exchange risk through a 
tougher exchange rate policy. Notice, finally, thet there is an important 
connection between exchenge rate risk and misalignment through the 
impact of credibility on the former. As mentioned, misalignment 
(cumulative losses of competitiveness) determines the expected size of 
devaluation which in turn determines to some extent the risk perceived by 
agents. Thus, if in order to reduce the volatility of exchange rates a no­
devaluation policy and strict commitment to a certain parity is followed but 
at the cost of a worsening misalignment, the exchange rate risk perceived 
by the agents may be very high even in the absence of speculative attacks 
and with low observed volatility. 
4.2 Derivatives trading and spot market price volatility 
Derivatives trading is one of the most frequently alleged causes 
of the perceived increese in volatility. The potential destabllising effect 
of derivatives has opened an as yet unsettled debate which has prompted 
a large number of studies and has frequently divided regulators , 
academics , the financial press and market participants . 
The concern about a destabllising effect of derivatives trading 
has generated several proposals which attempt to reduce this undesirable 
effect. Proposed measures include higher margin requirements on futures 
and options, the imposition of circuit breakers, and restrictions on some 
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trading strategies such as portfolio insurance or index srbitrage. 
The arguments attributing a destabilising effect to derivatives 
highlight the role of speculators and program-trading techniques. In this 
connection, it is argued that derivatives attract speculators due to the 
particular features of these markets: high leverage, centralised trading, 
low costs and the easiness of offsetting positions and selling short. The 
activity of speculators, looking for easy and huge benefits, may cause 
price movements which are unwarranted by the present or the expected 
value of economic fundamentals and which spill over into the underlying 
spot market through arbitrage operations. Following the 1987 stock 
market crash, fears about the destabilising effect of derivatives focused 
on the effect of program-trading strategies such as index arbitrage and 
portfolio insurance22• Then, it is argued, price movements can be 
exacerbated, leading to cascade effects and, in some circumstances ,  to a 
massive flow of sell or by orders on the same side, which markets cannot 
absorb without dramatic price fluctuations. 
The argument about speculation being a destabilising factor has 
been countered saying thst it forgets the role played by speculators who, 
by taking a risk the others try to hedge, mske hedging strategies and 
derivatives cheaper. Rational speculators may reasonably be considered 
to abound, buying when they think prices are low and selling when prices 
are high, so that speculative trading will tend to stabilise the spot 
market. Uninformed speculators will not be successful and will be 
eliminated quickly from the market. Also, there is abundant literature 
that questions the destabilising effect of program-trading strategies" . 
As additional counterweights to the arguments for derivatives 
causing a destabilising effect, the economic literature has pointed out 
"Portfolio insurance is a synthetic put option built by taking a short 
position in futures (or spot) and a long position in a riskless asset. To 
achieve the payoff sought (that is, limited losses and unlimited profits) 
the strategy requires dynamic management by selling the risky asset 
when prices fall and buying it when prices rise. 
" See, for example, Edwards (1988), Tosini(l988) and Rubinstein 
(1988) 
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severa! reasons in support of a stabilising effect, based on the beneficial 
and well accepted contributions of derivatives . Thus, insofar as 
derivatives offer cheap and accessible hedging, they may provide for a 
reduction and stabilisation of risk premia built into spot prices , thereby 
lessening a source of volatility. In addition, this hedging feasibility may 
encourage Institutional investors to take larger positions in the spot 
market so that the latter becomes more liquid and, therefore , less 
volatile. Furthermore, the trading of derivatives on centralised, highly 
visible and fast markets implies they act as information centres that pick 
up and disseminate the opinions of all participants . That may have, in 
turn, a beneficial effect on spot market efficiency, whose participants can 
base their investment decisions on such new information. 
The existence of both arguments and counter-arguments for a 
destabiHsing effect of derivatives suggests that the debate cannot be 
resolved wholly on a theoretical level and so should be analysed 
empirically. Hence the numerous empirical papers addressing the question 
(see Table 7 ) .  In this section, we empirically test whether the 
introduction of futures and options in Spain has caused an increase in the 
volatility of the associated spot market price". 
Financial futures and options were first introduced in Spain in 
March 1990. At present , there is highly active trading on the 10-year 
Treasury bond contract, 3-month interbank deposit contract and IBEX 35 
stock index contract". In order to test the effect of the introduction of 
these futures and options contracts on the underlying spot market price 
volatility, we use the financial prices analysed in section 3 .  However, the 
"Ayuso and Nlli1ez (1995) address the question for the Spenish bond 
market . Their methodology is adopted here . 
"The first contract launched was a 3-year bond contract. Since March 
1990 two more bond contracts have been launched: the 5-year-bond 
contract (April 1991) and the 10-year-bond contract (April 1992) . Also, 
interbank deposit contracts have been launched (the MIBOR-90 contract, 
introduced in October 1990, and the MIBOR-360 contract , introduced in 
October 1993) , stock index contracts (the IBEX-35 introduced in January 
1992) and exchange rate contracts (the D-mark/peseta and dollar/peseta 
contracts that were introduced in September 1991) . 
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peseta exchange rate contracts launched after 1990 were never successful 
and trading was closed in 1993. The reason for the failure is ,  probably, 
that when these contracts were launched, an active forward market was 
already in place and was quite liquid for numerous settlement dates, so 
there was no need for a futures markets with standardised contracts. 
Specifically, we analyse the following effects: the effect of 
government bond futures and options trading on the volatility of the debt 
index'·, the effect of interbank deposit futures and options trading on 
the volatility of 3-month interbank deposit rate, and the effect of IBEX -35 
futures and options trading on the volatility of the IBEX-35 index . 
Unfortunately, we are unahle to test the effect of foreign exchange 
forward trading or financial swaps since those derivatives are traded in 
OTe markets and there are no data available on trading nor prices. 
As in the previous subsection, we could analyse the effect of 
derivatives trading on the associated spot market price volatility simply 
by estimating such volatility before and after the introduction of futures 
and options markets. Nevertheless, in this case we take a different 
approach. In particular, following Ayuso and Nullez (1995), we add to the 
volatility model an additional explanatory variable which, quantitatively 
instead of qualitatively, captures the new element entalled by the 
emergence of derivatives. Ideally, the effect of the remaining variables 
affecting volatility would be depicted implicitly in the other perameters of 
the estimated model and the sign of the perameter of this new variable 
wouid enable it to test whether derivatives raise or reduce spot price 
volatility . 
The quantitative variable that we have selected to capture the 
,. For thp government bond futures .and options market, the fact that 
most (more than 90%) of the trading in futures and options bond contracts 
is centred on the 10-year contract whlle spot bond turnover does not 
exhibit such concentration, suggests that derivatives market perticipants 
consider that a single contract suffices for future-spot combined 
strategies, whatever the maturity of the spot bond. Therefore, it seems 
more interesting and accurate to analyze the effect of derivatives on the 
spot debt market as a whole, represented by the debt index, rather than 
focusing on the effect on just a specific maturity of said market. 
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effect of derivatives trading on spot price volatility is the ratio of total 
derivatives trading (futures and options) to turnover in the associated 
spot market. The ratio is preferred to total derivatives trading for two 
reasons . On one hand, given the eminently nominal nature of this 
variable, some form of standardisation is needed so that a distinction can 
be made between genuine increases in trading and what might be 
genera1ised increases in trading in all markets , as a result of positive 
inflation rates . And on the other, because most of the arguments 
favouring a destabi1ising effect of derivatives trading imply an increase 
in this ratio. 
The ratios used in the analysis are the following: for the 
government debt market, futures and options trading in Treasury bonds 
contracts on turnover in the spot market among members of the organised 
public debt market . For the money market, futures and options trading 
in MIBOR contracts on 3-month interbank deposit trading. Finally, for 
the stock market, futures and options trading in the IBEX -35 index 
contract on turnover in Madrid Stock Exchange" . 
The estimation results including the ratio of derivatives trading 
to spot trading are reported in Table 8 .  For the debt market, the 
coefficient of the derivatives trading/spot trading ratio (6,) has a 
negative sign and is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, 
although quantitatively small". Similar results are obtained for the 
interbank deposit market, where the estimated parameter 6,. is 
quantitatively rather small but of a negative sign and statistically 
significant. For the stock market, the sign of 6, is positive but it is not 
statistically significant at a 95% or at a 90% confidence level. 
These results suggest that, in the period under study, public 
27 For the public debt and money markets other ratios have been tried 
obtaining similar results to the ones reported here . 
'8A negative coefficient is even more relevant on observing that 
volatility itself may possibly have a positive effect on the volume of 
trading in the derivatives markets . 
- 28 -
debt and money market derivatives trading In organised markets has not 
exerted a destabilislng effect on the price volatility of the associated spot 
market . The result for the Ibex-35 Index futures and options is less 
conclusive but, in any case, of a rather small size . Therefore, the 
episodes of high volatility experienced during the period 1990-1995 In the 
public debt, money market and stock markets do not seem due to the 
growing significance of futures and options trading. Although we can not 
generalise these results to other derivatives markets (since we were 
unable to test the effect of foreign exchange forwards or financial swaps) 
our findings are In line with those found In the numerous studies 
addressing the same question" and with the arguments supported by 
numerous economists and central bankerslO• While the aforementioned 
studies have quite diverse approaches (different derivatives markets, 
different periods under study, different measures of volatility, different 
econometric methods, etc) their findings are rather homogenous: they 
generally find that spot market volatility has not been adversely affected 
by derivatives trading, although the latter may have enhanced some 
episodes of very short term volatility ( ,witching hours effect' or 
'expiration day' effect) .  
Therefore, policy proposals designed to curb volatility such as 
restrictions on derivatives trading, higher futures and options margin 
requirements and circuit breakers might not be needed . Furthermore, 
these measures could have an opposite effect to the one sought". Higher 
margin requirements and restrictions on some trading strategies would 
imply a reduction In the ability of certain Investors (not necessarily 
uninformed speculators) to participate In financial markets . This may 
mean that prices will undergo larger rather than smaller swings since the 
restricted Investors may be exactly the ones that would limit destabilislng 
speculation. Also, higher margin requirements could limit the ability of 
" See Table 7.  
3 .  See, for Instance, BIS (1994) , Crockett (1995) and Goodhart 
(1995) . 
" See Edwards (1988) and France, Kodres and Moser (1994) for a 
discussion on the effects of these proposals. 
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investors to hedge because of the higher cost of hedging strategies 
involving futures and options . Furthermore, the imposition of·circuit 
breakers may prove to be counter-productive as well . Under a circuit 
breaker scheme , trading will be stopped when certain predetermined 
conditions occur . The problem might be that circuit breakers do not allow 
markets to adjust fully to new information since when the breaker is 
activated the determination of equilibrium prices is interrupted . In 
general, these proposals may make markets less efficient, i . e .  less able 
to respond quickly to new information, which would produce a definite 
loss of economic welfare . 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The negative consequences of high financial volatility have been 
an important concern recently. Although its empirical relevance has not 
been proved conclusively, clear theoretic and intuitive arguments justify 
this concern . Many efforts have been conducted, therefore, to determine 
which is the relevant concept of volatility and how to measure it, which 
factors explain the course it follows , and which steps should be taken in 
order to curb volatility. 
Regarding the first question, it is the risk perceived by agents 
which determines their decisions and which, therefore , could have the 
negative consequences in terms of deterring the financial and real flows 
needed for an efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, there seems to 
be a consensus in the financial literature that the appropriate concept of 
volatility is the conditional variance which reflects agents' expectations 
about the future course of the unanticipated component of a series . In 
this paper we analyse price volatility in the major Spanish financial 
markets over the last eight years . In doing so we distinguish between 
variables that can fluctuate freely, for which 'we estimate a standard 
conditional heteroscedasticity model based on the observed course of the 
series , and the exchange rate, for which we also incorporate agents' 
perception about a possible future change in its fluctuation regime . The 
main conclusions in this respect can be summarised as follows: 
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The recent process of flnanclal innovation, deregulation, 
internationalisation and globalisation has not been accompanied by an 
upward trend in volatility . We observe, instead, periodical episodes of 
high volatility. These volatility increases, however, do not tend to last 
and are followed by later reductions. The only lasting increase seems 
to be that in the debt market around the summer of 1992. 
- In terms of decreasing volatility, the markets ranked as follows: the 
stock exchange , the foreign exchange market, the government debt 
market and the money markets. 
- Only the volatility in the government debt market shows asymmetric 
responses to shocks , it being more sensitive to debt price falls than to 
price increases . 
.. Day-ta-day volatilities seem to react, basically, to news concerning 
the own market although when relevant events like exchange rate 
crises occur, we observe contagion effects. There is also a significant 
although small effect of stock exchange volatility on the money and debt 
market volatilities. 
The commented episodes of high volatility can justify the 
existence of several proposals to curb volatility if, as has been argued, 
these peaks can be a potential source of systemic crisis . Others have 
defended the need for such measures on a different basis : current levels 
of volatility, even if they were not higher than before , could have more 
negative consequences if the level of agents' exposure to risk is currently 
higher . In any case , the rationality of those proposals stands on the 
identification of certain factors that are assumed to explain to some extent 
how volatility develops. This is the case of two interesting groups of 
proposals . 
First, the identification of the exchange rate regime as a 
conditioning factor of exchange rate volatility, associating severe regimes 
with low volatility and vice-versa, leads to the former being advocated to 
curb volatility . Second, the identification of derivatives trading as a 
cause of recent increases in volatility have generated different proposals, 
- 31 -
Therefore, in order to conclude about the pertinence of such measures it 
is of primary importance to check first whether the empirical evidence 
supports these assumed effects. We have focused precisely on these 
proposals because the recent Spanish experience is particuierly useful to 
analyse the above-mentioned effects. In both cases, combining the 
empirical evidence found in previous work with some extensions developed 
in this paper, we reach the conclusion that the empirical evidence does 
not support the reietions that would guarantee the success of the 
measures analysed. 
In particuier, the credibility of the exchange rate regime has 
brought about a situation where steps towards a stricter regime have not 
led necessarily to lower exchange risk, even in periods without 
speculetive attacks, and vice-versa (this conclusion is extensive to other 
European currencies) .  Attempts to reduce exchange rate risk by means 
of increasing the rigidity of fluctuation regimes may in fact be 
unsuccessful if the conditions for this regime to be credible do not hold . 
Conversely, to reduce the risk of foreign currency transactions, it may 
be preferable to adopt less ambitious exchange rate commitments that are 
flexible enough to warrant an acceptable degree of credibility, even 
though they might imply greater observed exchange rate voietility. 
We have summarised some empirical evidence which highlights the 
variables which, by affecting credibility, can condition the success of 
attempts to reduce exchange risk by a tougher exchange rate commitment. 
The cumuietive losses of competitiveness help to explein expectations 
about the size of a deprecistion associsted with a potential future 
devaluation. With respect .to the probability that agents attribute to such 
a future devaluation, several factors are at piey: a reputation effect; an 
effect of the general pace of the system; the exchange rate proximity to 
the deprecistion limit; and finally, the impact of the cost of parity 
maintenance implied by the need for a level of interest rates tailored to 
the defence of the commitment but not to the position in the economic 
cycie. 
Finally, public debt, stock exchange index and interbank deposit 
derivatives trading have not had a destabilising effect on the voietility of 
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the associated spot markets . Therefore, the episodes of high volatility 
experienced since 1990 seem not be fuelled by the growing significance of 
futures and options trading. Furthermore, the ratio of derivatives 
trading to spot trading, if significant in explaining the respective spot 
price volatility, has a negative sign, although the effect is of a small size. 
There are no available data to test whether our results can be extended 
to the case of OTC markets . With this caveat, our findings, in line with 
those found in the literature, rise serious doubts about the effectiveness 
of measures almed at curbing volatility by imposing restrictions on 
derivatives trading. Moreover, as has been argued, these restrictions 
could even have an opposite effect to that sought . 
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APPENDIX 
The corrected measure of risk can be derived as follows . Assume 
that Y t+r follows the process Rt, with conditional mean, in t, Il! , and 
conditional variance � .  However, agents assign, at t, a 
probability Pt to the fact tbat Y t.. will follow another process R2 
in t+'t with a different conditional mean � . 
Thus, the conditional mean, at time t, of Yt+t is: 
and the conditional variance can be written: 
Substituting Al into A2 yields 
where 
is the expected jump in the conditional mean. 
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(Al) 
Table 1 .  CONDITIONAL MEAN MODELS: GOODNESS-OF-FlT TESTS. 
N 
CI 
CS 
CIS 
NOTES : 
Xt = lOO*logIDt 
4>(L)-4>'(L) 
1874 
.00 
.10 
16.2 
Xt :0; lOO*logIBt 
I 4>(L) -4>'(L) I 
1860 
.00 
.23 
10.1 
x. = I, 
4>(L) =4>'(L) 
1873 
. 00  
. 26 
11.2  
- ID is the debt government index, IB is the stock exchange index and i is the 
3-month interbank interest rate. 
- 4»� is a fifth order polynomial in the Jag operator L. Its roots are outside the 
unit circle. .1 = I - L • 
- N stands for the number of observations. 
- ex stands for the Box-Pierce test on residual autocorrelation up to order x .  
Under the null (zero autocorrelation) it is distributed as a X2 with x degrees 
of freedom. 
- 4 in percentage points per annum. 
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Table 2. (DAILY) CONDITIONAL VARIANCE MODELS 
¢ls(L} A xt = C + �, Et+1Jt - N(O,�) 
� .. «0 + (�+Y1S;) E! + Pl�-l + P2�-a 
� a lOO*logIDt � '" lOO.lagIBt '" • I, 
N 1874 1860 1873 
a, .18e-3 ( . 2e-4) .07 ( .01) .03e-3 ( . 5e-5) 
a, . 09  ( . 007) .10 ( .01) . 18 ( . 01 )  
y, .07 ( . 007) 
�, .89 ( .004) .84 ( .02) .28 ( . 05) 
�, .58 ( . 04) 
HI 1 . 44 .61 3.71 
H5 2.51 1 . 31 8 . 63 
HIS 25.7 1 .88 14.7 
AS 1 . 11 1 .60 -.93 
NN .27 1 . 17 .22 
NP -.65 -1 . 25 -.54 
NOTES: 
- ID is the debt gove�nt index, IB is the stock exchange index and i is the 
3-month inter� interest rate. 
- S; is a dummy variable that takeS the unit value if Et is neptive and 0 
otherwise. 
- Hx stands for the LM test on residual heteroscedasticlty up to order x. Under 
the null (homoscedasticity) it is distributed as a X2 ,of x dep-ees of f"!8dom. 
- AS, NN Y NP are, respectively, the sign bias test, the neptive size bias test 
and the positive size bias test proposed by Engle and Ng (I993) . Under the null 
(absence of such effects) they are distributed as Student's t.  In tbe second 
column, AS could have lost power because the "scores" have not been 
considered due to multicollinearity problems. In any case, when applied to the 
original series J the AS test rejects the existence of a sign bias . 
... Standard errors in brackets. 
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Tablo 3. CONNECTIONS AMONG DEBT, MONEY MARKET AND STOCK 
EXCHANGE VOLATILITIES 
N 
a, 
a, 
HI 
H5 
H15 
NOTES : 
, , � ,  1 cz,,(L) 4. Xt .. C + L, (�5(L) 4xt-l) 
, .. 
1853 
.07 ( . 01) 
.10 (.01) 
.84 ( . 02) 
.61 
1 . 31 
1 . 88 
• 
+ E P!h!-l 
.4 
x! . � 
1853 
.19 ( .01) 
.678-4 ( . 68-5) 
.22 ( .04) 
.61 ( . 04) 
2 . 89 
7.44 
12.1 
X! = lOO.logIDt 
1853 
.410-3 ( . 130-3) 
.09 ( . 01 )  
. 1 0  ( . 02) 
.320-3 ( . 140-3) 
.08 ( .02) 
.84 ( .01) 
1 . 08 
2 . 63 
9.68 
m' - Neither the d';bt market squared innovations Et..... nor the money market 
squared ones E! .... are significant in the GJR model for IBt' The same can be 
,,' said with respect to the presence of Et-il in the i,; model. 
- See notes to Table 2 .  
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Table 4 .  EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY WITHIN THE REGIME 
A log(ESP/DEM)t .. C +4>A log{ESP/DEM}t_l + Et, Et+1lt. - N(O,�) 
, 
NUTES: 
N 
a, 
a, 
p, 
HI 
H5 
HIS 
AS 
NN 
NP 
he - tto  +L di S! + alE! + Pl�-1 
, .. 
Random Walk Mean Reversion 
C OlO, t11 -1 c .. O, 0<4><1 
1497 1497 
.01 ( . 001) .01 ( . 001) 
.02 ( . 002) .02 ( . 002) 
-.02 ( . 002) - . 01 ( .002) 
.41 ( .02) .39 ( .02) 
.56 ( .02) .57 ( .02) 
.03 . 25  
1 . 89 3.05 
6.00 8.12 
- . 35  -.37 
.96 1 . 31 
-.57 - . 79 
- 51 Y 52 are dummy variables that take the unit value from 02.06.92 and 
02.08.93, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
- See notes to Table 2.  
- See text for details on c and tP in the mean reversion case. 
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Table 5. EXCHANGE RATE REG\ME AND VOLATILITY (0) 
lAN-SEPT lAN-DEC lAN-IIAY 
1990 1991 1992 
FrM """float ERII IIlu: atabDity ERII 
STERLING 
Exchange r. 3.86 1 .73 1 . 69 
volatility 
Exchange risk 5.34 2.97 2.09 
1990-91 
EBiI 
ITALIAN 
!,!M 
Exchange r. volatility .44 .38 
Exchange risk 2.18 1 . 85 
(e) Exchange rate volatility and exchange risk at one-month horizon. 
Table 8.  BAND WIDTH AND VOLATILITY (0) 
1990-91 lAN-1IA Y 1992 
StabDity IIIIJI:. aiBblllty 
DBlTOW band D&rI'DW band 
FIlENCH FIlANC 
Exchange r. volatility .30 .20 
Exchange risk .77 .34 
BELGIAN FIlANC 
Exchange r .  volatility .35 .08 
Exchange risk .85 .10 
DANISH KRONE 
Excllanee r. volatility .52 .25 
Exchange risk 1.18 .43 
(e) Exchan.ie rate volatility and exchange risk at one-month horizon. 
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J 
lAN-DEC 
191M 
FrM fIoat 
4.71 
4.71 
9 . 1-2 
9.12 
191M 
StabD!ty 
_ band  
.43 
.55 
.51 
.59 
.69 
.83 
Table 7. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE EFFECT OF DERIVATIVES ON SPOT MARKET 
VOLATILITY 
Authors I Period I Spot market analysed I Effect on spot 
analysed price volatility 
Figlewsky (1981) 1975-79 GNMA (USA) In ...... 
Bortz (1984) 1975-82 T.Bond (USA) Moderate 
d ....... 
Morlatl .. Tos!nl 1975-83 GNMA (USA) DOD statistically 
(1985) significant 
Simpson " Ireland 1973-85 T . BIlIs Initial, decrease J 
(1985) subsequent 
increase 
Edwards (l988a) 1973-87 SI<P Index (USA) decrease 
Value Index (USA) decrease 
T . BIlIs (USA) decrease 
Eurodollar 90 day dep. decrease 
(USA) 
Edwards (l988b) 1972-87 SlP Index (USA) no effect 
Baldauf " Santoni 1975-89 SlP Index (USA) no effect 
(1991) 
Hodgson " Nicholls 1981-87 Australian Stock no lone-term" 
(1991) Index effect 
�toDdou " Foster 1986-90 Brent Crude OIl (UK) no effect 
(1992) 
Lee .. Obk (1992) 1979-85 NYSE Composite Index no effect 
(USA) 
1983-89 Tokio Stock Excban&e DO effect 
Index (Japen) 
1981-87 FT-SE 100 Sbore no effect 
Index (UK) 
1983-89 Han Song Index no effect 
(Hong-Kong) 
Cronin (1993) 1987-92 90 day D1BOR dec ..... 
(Ireland) 
1987-91 Long. GUt (capital DO effect 
2012) (Ireland) 
1987-91 Long GUt (capital no effect 
2006) (Ireland) 
1987-91 Long GUt (capital Increase 
. 2010) (Ireland) 
Robinson (1993) 1980-93 Ft-SE All Share Index Decrease 
(UK) 
Ayuso " NU1iez 1988-94 Treasury Bond Decrease 
(1995) (Spain) 
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Table 8. THE EFFECTS OF DERIVATIVES ON VOLATILITY IN THE SPOT MARKETS 
N 
a" 
a, 
NOTES: 
Xi = 10giB 
1853 
.07 ( .01) 
.09 ( .01) 
.84 ( .02) 
.01 ( .01) 
. 74 
1 . 39 
1.90 
x! • L 
1853 
.19 ( . 01) 
. 74e-4 ( . 70-5) 
.22 ( . 04) 
.62 ( . 04) 
- . 130-5 ( . 60-6) 
2.97 
7 . 67 
12.5 
, 
• logID x 
1853 
.58e-3 ( . 140-3) 
.09 ( . 01) 
.10 ( . 02) 
.38e-3 ( . 140-3) 
.06 ( .01) 
.85 ( .01) 
- .150-3 (.40-4) 
1 . 23 
2.78 
9 . 78 
- OIB is the ratio between total trading in derivatives on the IBEX 35 index and total spot 
t� in Madrid stock exchange. 
- 01 is the ratio between total trading in derivatives on 3-month MIBOR and total deposits 
at that term in the interbank market. 
- DID is the ratio between total trading in derivatives on government debt and total spot 
trading in the government debt market. 
- See notes to Table 2. 
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